RQC, an IND-CCA2 PKE based on Rank Metric

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https://pqc-rqc.org

Agenda

- Rank metric overview
- 2 Description of the scheme
- Round 2 modifications

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Rank weight and support

Let β_1, \ldots, β_m be a basis of \mathbb{F}_{q^m} over \mathbb{F}_q . To each vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$, one can associate a matrix $\mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{x}}$

$$\mathbf{x} = (x_0, \dots, x_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n \leftrightarrow \mathbf{M}_{\mathbf{x}} = \begin{pmatrix} x_{0,0} & \dots & x_{0,n-1} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \dots \\ x_{m-1,0} & \dots & x_{m-1,n-1} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$$

Definition (Rank weight)

Let
$$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$$
, $|\mathbf{x}|_r = \mathsf{Rank}(\boldsymbol{M}_{\mathbf{x}})$ where $\boldsymbol{M}_{\mathbf{x}} = (x_{i,j})$ with $x_j = \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} x_{i,j} \beta_i$.

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Definition (Support)

The support of a word is the \mathbb{F}_q -subspace generated by its coordinates:

$$\mathsf{Supp}(\boldsymbol{x}) = \langle x_0, \dots, x_{n-1} \rangle_{\mathbb{F}_q}$$

Difficult problems in rank metric

Problem (Rank Syndrome Decoding problem)

Given $m{H} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{(n-k) \times n}$, $m{s} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^{n-k}$, an integer r, find $m{e} \in \mathbb{F}_{q^m}^n$ such that:

- $\diamond He^T = s^T$
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Probabilistic reduction to the NP-Complete SD problem [GZ16]

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Public data: G is a generator matrix of some public code C

Secret key: sk = (x, y), Public key: pk = (h, s), Ciphertext: ct = (u, v)

$$\begin{array}{c} \underline{\mathsf{Alice}} \\ \operatorname{\mathsf{seed}}_{\mathsf{h}} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{\lambda}, \ \mathsf{h} \overset{\mathsf{\mathsf{seed}}_{\mathsf{h}}}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{F}^n_{q^m}, \\ (\mathsf{x},\mathsf{y}) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{S}^{2n}_{\omega}(\mathbb{F}_{q^m}), \ \mathsf{s} \leftarrow \mathsf{x} + \mathsf{h} \cdot \mathsf{y} \\ \mathsf{m} \leftarrow \mathcal{C}.\mathsf{Decode}\,(\mathsf{v} - \mathsf{u} \cdot \mathsf{y}) \end{array} \overset{\mathsf{\mathsf{seed}}_{\mathsf{h}}, \mathsf{s}}{\longleftarrow} \underbrace{ \begin{array}{c} \mathsf{\mathsf{Bob}} \\ (\mathsf{r}_1, \mathsf{r}_2, \mathsf{r}_3) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{S}^{3n}_{\omega_r}(\mathbb{F}_{q^m}), \\ \mathsf{u} \leftarrow \mathsf{r}_1 + \mathsf{h} \cdot \mathsf{r}_2, \ \mathsf{v} \leftarrow \mathsf{mG} + \mathsf{s} \cdot \mathsf{r}_2 + \mathsf{r}_3 \end{array}$$

Figure: Informal description of RQC.PKE

Correctness

$$\mathbf{v} - \mathbf{u} \cdot \mathbf{y} = \mathbf{mG} + (\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{h} \cdot \mathbf{y}) \cdot \mathbf{r}_2 + \mathbf{r}_3 - (\mathbf{r}_1 + \mathbf{h} \cdot \mathbf{r}_2) \cdot \mathbf{y}$$
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Decrypts whenever the public code $\mathcal C$ decodes the small weight error $\mathbf x \cdot \mathbf r_2 - \mathbf y \cdot \mathbf r_1 + \mathbf r_3$ for $(\mathbf x, \mathbf y)$ and $(\mathbf r_1, \mathbf r_2, \mathbf r_3)$ small rank weight vectors

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 \diamond Choice for \mathcal{C} : **Gabidulin codes** hence no decryption failure

Semantic security

Theorem

Under the assumption of the hardness of the 2-DIRSD and 3-DIRSD problems, RQC is IND-CPA in the Random Oracle Model.

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- \diamond IND-CPA RQC PKE ightarrow IND-CCA2 RQC KEM using [HHK17]
- \diamond IND-CCA RQC KEM \rightarrow IND-CCA2 RQC PKE using Hybrid Encryption

Parameters

	Public Key	Secret Key	Ciphertext	Shared Secret	DFR
RQC 128	853	40	1,690	64	0
RQC 192	1,391	40	2,766	64	0
RQC 256	2,284	40	4,552	64	0

Figure: RQC sizes expressed in bytes

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NIST comments on RQC

From NIST report [AAA+19]

- Rank metric adds significant diversity to the standardization process
- RQC has the most conservative approach to IND-CCA2 security in rank metric (no DFR, no code indistinguishability assumption)

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- Additional analysis on algebraic attacks is required
- RQC suffers in decryption speed

Security-related changes

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- ⋄ Improved analysis on algebraic attacks using Groebner basis
- RQC relies on ideal codes (generalization from quasi-cyclic codes)
- Parameters updated so that error weight increases regularly with each level of security (small increase in parameter size)

Reference implementation

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- No longer depends on external librairies

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- Outperforms MPFQ-based and NTL-based implementations
- Rank-Based Cryptography Library (rbc-lib.org) will be released to promote community development on rank based cryptography

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- Outperforms MPFQ-based and NTL-based implementations
- Rank-Based Cryptography Library (rbc-lib.org) will be released to promote community development on rank based cryptography
- Recently submitted to SUPERCOP (reference and optimized)

Optimized implementation

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	AVX2 Implementation			Improvement vs 2019/04/10		
	Keygen	Encaps	Decaps	Keygen	Encaps	Decaps
RQC 128	0.20	0.28	1.02	×3.5	×4.6	x6.5
RQC 192	0.38	0.55	2.22	x3.0	×4.0	x6.6
RQC 256	0.62	0.89	3.74	×2.9	×4.0	x6.2

Figure: Performances in millions of CPU cycles and comparison to reference implementation from 2019/04/10 package using an i7-7820 @3.6GHz CPU

Towards constant time implementation

- New Gabidulin code's decoding algorithm without branching related to the weigth of the error to be decoded [BBGM19]
- ♦ Small performance overhead (less than 10%)

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 Implementation of the new algorithm available. Additional effort required to get a constant-time implementation (ongoing work)

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- Rank metric adds diversity to the standardization process
- RQC features attractive key sizes w.r.t. to code-based schemes
- RQC features a conservative approach
 - No decryption failure
 - No code indistinguishability assumption

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- ⋄ RQC is a code-based IND-CCA2 PKE using the rank metric
- Rank metric adds diversity to the standardization process
- RQC features attractive key sizes w.r.t. to code-based schemes
- RQC features a conservative approach
 - No decryption failure
 - No code indistinguishability assumption
- RQC features good performances w.r.t. to code-based schemes
 - Constant time achievable with small overhead

- [AAA+19] Gorjan Alagic, Jacob Alperin-Sheriff, Daniel Apon, David Cooper, Quynh Dang, Yi-Kai Liu, Carl Miller, Dustin Moody, Rene Peralta, Ray Perlner, Angela Robinson, and Daniel Smith-Tone. Status report on the first round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process. NIST, 2019.
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Thank you for your attention. Questions?